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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit has historically played a major role in the devel-
opment of Indian law. The cases decided during this survey period were
certainly no exception. Among the court's numerous decisions affecting
Indians were those involving the standard of proof in cases seeking to
disestablish Indian reservations, the duty owed by the Secretary of the
Interior to the Indians in the administration of oil and gas leasing on
Indian lands, the effect of state gas price control acts on Indian royalties,
the necessary standard of compliance with acts allowing non-Indians to
obtain interests in Indian real property, the conflict between Indian sov-
ereign immunity and the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure requiring join-
der of all necessary parties to an action, and the Indians' power to tax
non-Indians who develop the Indians' natural resources. Additionally,
this article discusses the enforcement power of Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission under the Natural Gas Act; the construction of oil and
gas operating agreements as to deep geologic horizons; and finally, the
consequences of conveyancing real property when a predecessor in in-
terest has suffered due process violations in the form of defective tax
sales or condemnation proceedings.
I. INDIAN LAW
A. Disestablishment of Indian Lands: Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah
1. Introduction
Since the mid-nineteenth century, numerous acts of Congress have
reflected the constantly changing attitude of the United States towards
Indians. These congressional acts have far-reaching and potentially
devastating effects on the rights of Indians today.' During this survey
period the Tenth Circuit, in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,2 disestablished a
substantial portion of the Ute's reservation.3 Through such decisions,
1. This discussion is limited to "disestablishment" cases involving lands which at
some point were part of an Indian reservation. See infra note 3.
2. 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Utes v. Utah].
3. Disestablishment refers to the process whereby Indian lands are withdrawn from
the Indians' control. Disestablishment often resulted from a general allotment act of Con-
gress, which, in an attempt to assimilate the Indians into the agrarian lifestyle of their
neighbors, allotted "homesteads" to individual Indians in order to curtail their nomadic
lifestyle. The surplus unalloted lands were then "opened" to non-Indian settlement. The
typical issue in disestablishment cases is whether the land was disestablished by the mere
language of the general allotment act which opened it, or whether additional evidence is
necessary to conclusively divest the Indians of title and interest in their lands. The answer
to this question, and hence the status of such "opened" lands depends upon the language
of the Act and the circumstances underlying its passage. Compare Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481 (1983); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); and Solem v. Bartlett, 104 S.
Ct. 1161 (1984) (all holding that the opened lands retained their reservation status) with
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) and DeCoteau v. District County
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the Indians are threatened with the cummulative disestablishment of
their lands. 4 Once a court finds that Congress, at any point in history,
intended to disestablish part or all of an Indian reservation, such land is
no longer Indian land. In order to prevent the widespread disestablish-
ment of Indian lands, courts generally strictly construe those acts which
open Indian lands.
Subsequent to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Utes v. Utah, the
Supreme Court, in Solem v. Bartlett,5 reviewed a case very similar to Utes
v. Utah and found the evidence insufficient to support disestablishment.
The result in Utes v. Utah appears inconsistent with Solem because the
Tenth Circuit viewed a record that the district court found devoid of the
"hard evidence necessary to overcome the construction of ambiguities
in favor of the Indians."'6 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit disestablished
a substantial portion of the Ute Indian Reservation known as the Uintah
Reservation.
7
The district court in Utes v. Utah8 found, inter alia, that the Ute Res-
ervation remained "Indian country," 9 except to the extent it was specifi-
cally altered by Congress.' 0 The district court found that the tract
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (both holding that the opened lands lost their reservation
status). 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983).
4. Congressional acts opening Indian lands are often referred to as "surplus land
acts" because they were enacted to appropriate the Indians' surplus lands. These acts
sometimes reveal that Congress believed that the Indians' best interests would be served
by eliminating the reservation system. Although Congress has since discarded this belief,
Indians today nevertheless find themselves bound by these archaic acts, which, though no
longer approved by Congress, still constrain courts. See Solem v. Bartlett, 140 S. Ct. 1161,
1165 (1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
6. Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1155 (D. Utah 1981) (citing
United States v. Long Elk, 565 F.2d 1032, 1040 (8th Cir. 1977)), affid in part, rev 'd in part,
715 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983).
7. It is the Tenth Circuit's disestablishment of the Uintah portion of the Ute Reserva-
tion which appears to contradict the Supreme Court's holding in Soem. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's ruling as to the Uintah portion also sparked the dissent ofJudge Doyle. See Utes v.
Utah, 716 F.2d at 1315-22.
8. Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982) (defines "Indian country" for purposes of criminal juris-
diction). The Utes brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to estab-
lish the exterior boundaries of their reservation and to enjoin Utah from asserting criminal
jurisdiction. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (D. Utah 1981).
10. Although the Utes appealed the district court's disestablishment of the following
four tracts, the Tenth Circuit found the applicable acts and presidential proclamation ef-
fected disestablishment. First, by the Act of May 24, 1888, ch. 310, 25 Stat. 157 (1889),
Congress removed a 7,040 acre tract known as the Gilsonite Strip from the Uintah Reser-
vation. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1099. Second, Congress extin-
guished the Uncompahgre Reservation under the Act ofJune 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 87
(1899). See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1104. Third, by the authority vested
in him by the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1070 (1905), President
Roosevelt withdrew 1,010,000 acres from the Uintah Reservation, which lands were made
a part of the Uintah Forest Reserve. See Proclamation of July 14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3116,
(1907); 716 F.2d at 1313. Fourth, by the Act of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Stat. 269, 285
(1911), Congress extinguished the Utes' interest in 56,000 acres known as the Strawberry
River Reclamation. See Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2d at 1314. By the Act of March 11, 1948, ch.
108, 62 Stat. 72 (1949), Congress added the Hill Creek Extension to the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation. See Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2d at 1301. This discussion is therefore limited to the
disestablishment of the portion of the Utes' land known as the Uintah Reservation.
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known as the Uintah Reservation had not been disestablished. The
Tenth Circuit reversed, and found that the Acts of 1902, 1903, 1904 and
1905 "opening" the Uintah Reservation changed its status to "public
domain." 11
2. The Legislative Basis for Disestablishment
As the basis for its disestablishment holding, the Tenth Circuit re-
lied primarily on the Indian Appropriations Act of 1902.12 This Act
states in relevant part, that "all the unallotted lands within said reserva-
tion shall be restored to the public domain."' 13 Congress, however, be-
lieved that it needed the consent of the Utes in order to open their
lands, 14 and the disestablishment sought under the 1902 Act was condi-
tioned upon the consent of a majority of the adult male Utes. 15 The
Utes vehemently opposed ceding major portions of their reservation to
the government, so the 1902 Act was never effectuated. 16 The Tenth
Circuit held that the subsequent Acts carried forward the intent of the
1902 Act, although they did not expressly contain the language restor-
ing the reservation lands to the "public domain." 17 In other words, the
majority felt that the 1902 Act established a "baseline purpose of dises-
tablishment" which was consumated by the subsequent acts.18
In his dissent, Judge Doyle agreed with the holding of the district
court that the 1902 Act did not establish a baseline purpose of disestab-
lishment that was carried out by the Acts of 1903, 1904 and 1905. Nor
did he feel that the 1905 Act demonstrated that Congress intended to
extinguish all of the Ute's interest in the Uintah Reservation. 19 Judge
Doyle argued that Congress intended the opening under the 1902 Act to
take effect only after the Ute's consented. Therefore, congressional in-
tent cannot be retroactively inferred where Congress later learned that
Indian consent was unnecessary.
20
In the Indian Appropriations Acts of 190321 and 1904,22 Congress
11. Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2d at 1307-15.
12. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263-264 (1903). See Utes v. Utah, 716
F.2d at 1308-13.
13. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263-64 (1903).
14. It was not until 1903 that the Supreme Court announced that Congress could
unilaterally diminish Indian reservations. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
15. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1118.
16. In addition to the Ute's resistance there were delays in the funding necessary to
execute the Act. 521 F. Supp. at 1116.
17. 716 F.2d at 1310-12.
18. Id. (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). Commen-
tators have criticized the reliance in Rosebud on an unratified agreement by the Indians as
establishing a "baseline purpose of disestablishment." Rules of strict construction militate
against the Court's method of tacking documents together to establish congressional in-
tent. See Note, Indian Law-Boundary Disestablishment Through The Operation Of Surplus Land
Acts, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 1305, 1322-23; see also Case Developments, Indian Land Claims-A
Question of Congress' Right to Unilaterally Abrogate Indian Treaty Provisions: Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Richard Kneip, 21 How. L.J. 625, 642 (1978).
19. 716 F.2d at 1315-22 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 982 (1903).
22. Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 207 (1904).
1984]
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reinacted altered provisions of the 1902 Act to dispose of those Uintah
lands not already claimed by the Utes. 23 The Indian Appropriations Act
of 1905 also intended to open the surplus Indian lands to non-Indian
settlement. 24 In drafting the 1905 Act, Congress was concerned that the
opened lands would be quickly seized by land speculators rather than
homesteaders; 25 therefore, Congress used language which limited the
opening to disposition "under the general provisions of the homestead
and town-site laws" rather than using the "public domain" language of
the 1902 Act.2 6 Congress was not concerned with whether the Utes
would retain any interest in the opened lands because it assumed the
lands would be purchased and settled by homesteaders. 27 Indeed, the
distinction between the "public domain" language of the 1902 Act and
the restrictive language of the 1905 Act was intended for the benefit of
homesteaders, not the Utes.
28
3. Analysis
In light of Solen v. Bartlett,2 9 the Tenth Circuit's reliance on the
"public domain" language of the 1902 Act is questionable. In Solem, the
party seeking disestablishment argued that the Cheyenne River Act ef-
fected disestablishment.3 0 That Act referred to the opened lands as
"the. public domain" and "the reservation thus diminished." t3 ' The
Supreme Court stated that, while those phrases lended support to the
disestablishment argument, when balanced against the rest of the Act's
stated goals, those phrases did not "carry the burden of establishing an
express congressional purpose to diminish."
'3 2
Solem, moreover, reaffirmed the doctrine that ambiguous acts of
Congress are to be construed in favor of the Indians by requiring clear
proof of congressional intent to disestablish. In Utes v. Utah, the only
evidence adduced to carry this burden was the similarity between the
1902 Act, which contained explicit disestablishment language, and the
1905 Act.3 3 Commentators have criticized this method of proving in-
tent because it requires an unproveable assumption of congressional in-
tent, which is contrary to principles of strict construction mandated by
23. The 1903 Act deleted the requirement in the 1902 Act which necessitated the
Indians' approval of the disestablishment, based on the Supreme Court's holding in Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit
found that neither the 1903 Act nor the 1904 Act changed the operative terms of the 1902
Act. Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2d at 1310.
24. See Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048 (1905).
25. See Indian Appropriation Bill, 1906: Hearings before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. of
Ind. Aff., 58th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905); Utes v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1128-32.
26. Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2dat 1310-11.
27. Utes v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1127-32.
28. Id.
29. 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
30. Cheyenne River Act, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (1908).
31. Solem, 104 S. Ct. at 1168.
32. Id. at 1169.
33. 716 F.2d at 1308-11.
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the courts when construing acts affecting Indians.
34
In an ineffective attempt to explain the relationship between the
1902 and 1905 Acts,3 5 the Utes v. Utah court cited its earlier decision in
Hanson v. United States.3 6 In Utes v. Utah, the court found that Hanson was
decided under the 1902 Act, and that the 1905 Act merely extended the
date of opening the Uintah lands. 3 7 Yet, the result reached in Hanson is
incongruous with the result in Utes v. Utah. In Hanson, the Tenth Circuit
found that the Utes retained the beneficial title to the lands opened
under the 1902 Act.3 8 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit in Utes v. Utah
cited Hanson's analysis of the 1902 and 1905 Acts to support its holding
that the 1902 Act extinguished the Ute's interest in the opened lands of
the Uintah Reservation.
39
Utes v. Utah is inconsistent with Hanson in a second way. The Tenth
Circuit in Utes v. Utah, based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the legislation involved in DeCoteau v. District County Court,40 found that
the term "public domain" in the 1902 Act demonstrated that Congress
intended to disestablish the Uintah Reservation. 4 1 In Hanson, however,
the Tenth Circuit did not rely on the "public domain" language, but in
fact held that the Utes held a beneficial interest in the "public domain,"
which consisted of opened Ute Reservation. 4 2 Thus, Hanson did not
view the term "public domain" as inconsistent with the Ute's interest in
the Uintah Reservation. Solem has since pointed out that, while isolated
phrases are indicative of congressional intent, an act must be read as a
whole.
4 3
In addition to the language of an act, another factor courts use to
determine the intent behind an early surplus land act is the method by
which the Indians were paid for the lands opened. For example, in Rose-
bud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,4 4 the Rosebud Sioux agreed to cede unallotted
portions of their reservation in return for a lump-sum payment. The
Supreme Court found this strongly indicative of congressional intent to
extinguish the Sioux's interest in the land. The method of payment pro-
34. See supra note 18. In both Rosebud and Utes v. Utah it was not possible to prove that
congressional intent carried through to the subsequent acts. Nevertheless, put in the diffi-
cult position of trying to discern congressional intent, both courts found a "baseline pur-
pose of disestablishment" in the acts.
35. 716 F.2d at 1310-11.
36. 153 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1946).
37. 716 F.2d at 1310-11.
38. 153 F.2d at 163.
'39. 716 F.2d at 1310-11.
40. 420 U.S. 425,446 (1975) (the Court implied that "returned to the public domain"
is synonymous with "stripped of reservation status").
41. 716 F.2d at 1302.
42. "Thus, Congress has recognized the beneficial title of such Indians to lands of
such area restored to the public domain by the Act of May 27, 1902." Hanson, 153 F.2d at
163 (emphasis added).
43. Solem, 104 S. Ct. at 1169 ("[R]ead as a whole [the Act] does not present an explicit
expression of congressional intent to diminish the . . .Reservation.").
44. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
1984]
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vided by the legislation at issue in Solem v. Bartlett4 5 was perhaps the
strongest factor underlying the Court's decision to uphold the reserva-
tion status of the opened portions of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reserva-
tion. 46 Rather than a sum-certain payment as in Rosebud, the Act in Solem
provided for payment to the Indians only as the lands were subsequently
sold. 4 7 Based on this evidence, the Supreme Court found that the
United States served as a guardian and trustee for the Indians, and that
the opened, but unsold, lands retained their reservation status.
48
Utes v. Utah involved the title to several tracts of land4 9 and both
forms of payment. 50 The majority opinion noted those tracts for which
the Utes received sum-certain payments to support its disestablishment
holding. 5 ' The court made no attempt, however, to reconcile the uncer-
tain form of payment provided by the Act opening the portion known as
the Uintah Reservation with its disestablishment holding. Judge Doyle,
dissenting, found the uncertain form of payment for the Uintah Reserva-
tion another indication that the Uintah Reservation was not
disestablished.
52
Courts also consider the subsequent administrative treatment of
opened lands to determine the land's status. But, as was the case in
Solem, such evidence is often "so rife with contradictions and inconsis-
tencies as to be of no help to either side."'53 In Utes v. Utah, Congress'
subsequent treatment of the opened lands revealed "no consistent, clear
and uniform identification of the reservation's status."
5 4
In Utes v. Utah, the Tenth Circuit's statutory construction appears
flawed 55 in ruling that the Uintah Reservation had been disestablished.
Both the reasoning of the district court, and Judge Doyle's dissent, illus-
trate the lack of conclusive evidence to support disestablishment. In
light of the doctrine of constructing ambiguous acts in favor of the Indi-
ans, and in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Solem v. Bart-
lett, the Tenth Circuit's holding is highly questionable.
45. 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984). The legislation was the Cheyenne River Act, ch. 218, 35
Stat. 460 (1908).
46. 104 S. Ct. at 1167-68.
47. Section 6 of the Cheyenne River Act, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (1908) provides, in
part: "From the proceeds arising from the sale. . . of the lands . . . there shall be depos-
ited in the Treasury of the United States, to the credit of the Indians . . . the sums to
which the respective tribes may be entitled."
48. 104 S. Ct. at 1168 (citing Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962)).
49. See supra note 10.
50. 716 F.2d at 1314.
51. Id. The Utes were compensated for the 1,010,000 acres added to the Uintah For-
est Reserve by presidential proclamation pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479,
33 Stat. 1048, 1070 (1905). See Uintah and White River Bands of the Ute Indians v. United
States, 152 F. Supp. 953 (1957). The Utes were also compensated for 56,000 acres known
as the Strawberry River Reclamation. 716 F.2d at 1314.
52. 761 F.2d at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
53. Solem, 104 S. Ct. at 1170.
54. 716 F.2d at 1313.
55. See supra notes 12-34 and accompanying text.
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B. Oil and Gas Leasing on Indian Lands
The Tenth Circuit, in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp. ,56
sidestepped the issue of the fiduciary duty owed by the Secretary of the
Interior to the Jicarilla in administering oil and gas leasing on their
lands. 5 7 In so doing, the Tenth Circuit has approved a passive role for
the federal government in protecting the Indian's rights when oil and
gas leasing is involved. InJicarilla v. Supron, theJicarilla Indians brought
suit against Supron, 58 an oil and gas lessee under leases executed in the
early 1950's. The Jicarilla disputed the amount of royalties they re-
ceived from the defendant oil and gas companies. The Tribe also
named the Secretary of the Interior as a defendant for an alleged breach
of his fiduciary duty. 59
1. Fiduciary Duty of the Secretary of the Interior
The most significant aspect officarilla v. Supron was the Tenth Cir-
cuit's ruling that the Secretary did not breach any fiduciary duty he may
have owed the Jicarilla in the administration of oil and gas leasing on
their lands. 60 The district court found that the Secretary had breached
his fiduciary duty to the Indians on several counts. 6 1 The district court
found that the Secretary failed to interpret the leases and Interior regu-
lations in the Jicarilla's best interests. 6 2 The district court also found
that the Secretary failed to adequately monitor development of the
leases. 63 The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding it unnecessary to decide
the fiduciary duty issue. Although purportedly abstaining from deciding
the fiduciary duty issue, the court implicitly decided that the Secretary
owes no such duty. The result of this decision is contrary to decisions of
both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. 64 Only by avoiding the
fiduciary issue was the Tenth Circuit able to reverse the district court.
Instead of holding the Secretary to a fiduciary standard, the court based
56. 728 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1984), reh'g granted, Mar. 30, 1984 [hereinafter cited as
Jicarilla v. Supron].
57. A fiduciary duty, owed to Indians by the federal government, has been recognized
in many areas. The litigants inJicarilla v. Supron briefed extensively the applicability of a
fiduciary duty to the government's administration of the Indian oil and gas leasing
program.
58. Also named as defendants were Southland Royalty Co., Gas Co. of New Mexico
and Exxon Corp. The State of New Mexico intervened on the issue of the applicability of
New Mexico's price ceiling on natural gas. See infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
59. See 728 F.2d at 1558-59.
60. The breach of fiduciary duty was one of three issues in which Judge Seymour
dissented. 728 F.2d 1563-73 (Seymour, J. dissenting). Judge Seymour agreed only with
the majority's affirmation of the district court's dismissal of the tribe's anti-trust claims. Id.
at 1563.
61. 479 F. Supp. at 547-51 (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286
(1942)).
62. 479 F. Supp. at 549-51.
63. Id. at 547-48. The Jicarilla alleged a lack of diligent development and failure to
drill offset wells to protect against drainage. Although the district court found that the
lessees had not failed to develop the leases diligently, District Court Judge Mechem found
that the Secretary breached his fiduciary duty by failing to ensure that the lessees diligently
develop the leases.
64. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
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its review on the less exacting administrative law standard of "abuse of
discretion."
6 5
The substantive issue which served as the basis of the fiduciary duty
question involved the method used to calculate the value of natural gas
produced. 66 The Interior regulations set forth the methods used to de-
termine royalties which accrue on Indian lands.6 7 The Jicarilla lands
produced a natural gas referred to as "wet gas," 68 for which the regula-
tions give two methods to determine royalties.
69
On the basis of the Interior's regulations, 70 the district court or-
dered a "dual accounting" to calculate the amount of royalty due the
Jicarilla. 7 1 Dual accounting requires that both "gross proceeds ' 72 and
"aggregate value ... of all commodities" 73 be determined. The royalty
due is based upon the greater of the two values.74 Supron argued, and
the Tenth Circuit held, that a production company should not be ac-
countable for the aggregate value of all commodities when the gas is
sold at the wellhead to a refinery over which the production company
has no control. In her dissent, Judge Seymour argued that such a con-
struction of the regulation would be conducive to "sweetheart deals"
between the producer and the refiner, and that the regulation makes no
such exception.
75
The Tenth Circuit based its holding on three factors. First, it found
dual accounting to be inconsistent with the interpretation given the reg-
ulation by the Interior for many years. 7 6  Second, when the
lessee/producer does not own the refinery, it has no control over the
aggregate value of the commodities obtained from the unprocessed wet
65. 728 F.2d at 1560.
66. This value is in turn used to determine the royalty due.
67. (a) Royalty accrues on the dry gas, whether produced as such or as residue
gas after the extraction of gasoline.
(b) If the lessee derives revenue on gas from two or more products, a royalty
normally will be collected on all such products.
(c) For the purpose of computing royalty, the value of wet gas shall be either the
gross proceeds accruing to the lessee from the sale thereof or the aggregate value
determined by the Secretary of all commodities, including residue gas, obtained
therefrom, whichever is greater.
30 C.F.R. § 221.50 (1982) (recodified at 30 C.F.R. 206.105 (1984)). To avoid confusion,
this comment will cite the 1982 regulations.
68. Wet gas is defined as "Natural gas containing liquid hydrocarbons in solution,
which may be removed by a reduction of temperature and pressure or by a relatively sim-
ple extraction process." 8 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw 831 (1982); see
also 728 F.2d at 1567 n.4 (concerning methods of marketing wet gas and how royalty calcu-
lations are made).
69. See 30 C.F.R. § 221.50(c) (1982). See supra note 67.
70. See 30 C.F.R. § 221.50(c) (1982).
71. 479 F. Supp. at 551.
72. That is, the amount paid to the lessee for products sold at the wellhead.
73. This amount includes those products obtained from the gas after it has been
refined.
74. 30 C.F.R. § 221.50(c) (1982). See supra note 67.
75. 728 F.2d at 1568-69 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (explaining how "sweetheart deals"
will be encouraged in the absence of dual accounting).
76. Id. at 1559-60.
[Vol. 62:1
LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
gas it sells to the refinery. 7 7 Third, a provision in the leases involved in
ficarilla v. Supron vested discretion in the secretary to conclusively deter-
mine the royalties due.
7 8
In her dissent, Judge Seymour found these three factors unpersua-
sive. Although the Secretary's construction of Interior regulations is
normally given substantial deference, Judge Seymour stated that neither
the Interior's former nor present practices can lower the Secretary's fi-
duciary duty to administer the royalty regulations in the best interests of
the Jicarilla.
79
In response to the majority's exception to dual accounting when the
lessee/producer has no control over the aggregate value of products
eventually produced, Judge Seymour noted that the regulations do not
distinguish or make exception for those situations. 80 She also stated
that the majority's interpretation of the regulation made subsections (b)
and (c) redundant. 8 1 Judge Seymour found further support for her po-
sition in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act.8 2 She noted that "the purpose
of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act is to ensure that Indian tribes receive
the maximum benefit from mineral deposits on their lands."
'8 3
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Jicarilla v. Supron, both the
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
the Secretary owes a fiduciary duty to the Indians. Contrary to the result
reached inJicarilla v. Supron, both courts found that such a duty exists.
In United States v. Mitchell,84 (Mitchell II) the Supreme Court recently
addressed the Secretary's fiduciary duty to the Indians. That opinion
gave three factors which determine the extent of the Secretary's duty:
(1) the pervasiveness of the Secretary's role in the area in question,
(2) the extent of the regulations involved, and (3) the intent of Con-
gress. 8 5 These three factors mandated the imposition of a fiduciary duty
upon the Secretary in administering timber sales on Indian lands. In the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act, Congress delegated to the Secretary the ad-
ministration of oil and gas leasing on Indian lands. 86 The oil and gas
leasing regulations inJicarilla v. Supron were as comprehensive and per-
vasive as the timber management regulations in Mitchell 11.87
The Court in Mitchell II distinguished United States v. Mitchell,8 8
(Mitchell I) which held that the Secretary owes a duty of only limited trust
to the Indians. The Court stated:
77. Id. at 1559.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1566 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1568.
81. Id.
82. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of May 11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 348 (1938).
83. 728 F.2d at 1568 (Seymour. j., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
84. 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983).
85. Id. at 2969-72.
86. See 25 U.S.C. § 392 (1982).
87. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 163 (1984) (general forest regulations of the BIA) with 25
C.F.R. § 211 (1984) (leasing ol tribal lands for mining).
88. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
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In contrast to the bare trust created by the General Allotment
Act, the statutes and regulations now before us clearly give the
Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian re-
sources and land for the benefit of the Indians. They thereby
establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the
United States' fiduciary responsibilities.8 9
Given the three Mitchell II factors, the similarity between the timber
sales regulations and the oil and gas leasing regulations should require
the Tenth Circuit to impose a fiduciary duty upon the Secretary in his
administration of oil and gas leasing equal to the duty imposed upon
him in his sales of Indian timber.
In 1982, the Tenth Circuit considered the nature of the obligation
placed on the Secretary by Congress in administering oil and gas leasing
on Indian lands. In Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior,90 the
Tenth Circuit stated that the Secretary has a fiduciary duty as trustee of
Indian lands. Reviewing the same statute and regulations that were in-
volved inJicarilla v. Supron, the Tenth Circuit in Kenai stated that "[a]s a
fiduciary for the Indians, the Secretary is responsible for overseeing the
economic interests of Indian lessors, and has a duty to maximize lease
revenues." 9 1 Although Kenai invoked the fiduciary standard to justify
the Secretary's discretionary action, the fiduciary doctrine should apply
to compel the Secretary to act in the best interests of Indians. The
Tenth Circuit inJicarilla v. Supron made no attempt to distinguish its ear-
lier decision in Kenai because the court found it unnecessary to deter-
mine the fiduciary issue. Given the clear language of Kenai, however, the
court's holding inJicarilla v. Supron is untenable.
Another factor militates strongly in favor of the court reversing it-
self on rehearing. The majority quoted a provision in the lease which
purported to allow the Secretary discretion to determine royalties.
9 2
The court's reliance upon the lease was unwarranted, given the plain
language of the regulations and the Secretary's fiduciary duty.
On rehearing, the Tenth Circuit should follow both Mitchell II and
Kenai and impose a fiduciary duty on the Secretary in administration of
oil and gas leasing on Indian lands. After finding such a duty, the Tenth
Circuit should require dual accounting, not only in those circumstances
where the production company owns the refinery, but also in those cir-
cumstances where the production company sells at the wellhead. Only
in this way can the court give full effect to the Indian Mineral Leasing
Act.
2. Effect of State Gas Price Control Acts on Indian Royalties
In Jicarilla v. Supron, the Tenth Circuit also reversed the district
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
90. 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 386 (citing Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 906 (1968)).
92. 728 F.2d at 1559.
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court's finding that the New Mexico Natural Gas Pricing Act 93
(NMNGPA) did not place a ceiling on the value of natural gas produced
on Indian lands for the purpose of determining the Indians' royalties.
9 4
The Tenth Circuit held that the NMNGPA does apply to gas produced
on Indian lands and can therefore limit Indian royalties. 9 5 Judge Sey-
mour dissented, and found that federal law preempts the NMNGPA to
the extent the NMNGPA attempts to limit Indian royalties.
9 6
The resolution of conflicts among federal, state and Indian govern-
ments depends on the specific interests at stake of each party. 9 7 The
Tenth Circuit found Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes9 8 and Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation9 9 determinative of the pre-
emption issue in Jicarilla v. Supron. In both of these cases the Indians
operated retail cigarette stores which they claimed were exempt from
state taxes because of their sovereign immunity. The resulting lower
prices induced non-Indians to travel to the reservations to make their
purchases, to the detriment of state tax revenues. In both cases, the
Supreme Court found that the states' interest in uniform taxation out-
weighed the Indians' interest in encouraging business on their reserva-
tions at state expense.100
The court's reliance on Moe and Confederated Tribes, however, was
misplaced. The direct frustration of the state's interests in these two
cases was not present in Jicarilla v. Supron. In Jicarilla v. Supron, New
Mexico admitted that the royalty received by the Indians would not af-
fect its consumers' cost for natural gas.101 New Mexico therefore lacked
a significant interest in the Indian royalty issue, and the Moe and Confed-
erated Tribes balancing test should have weighed in favor of the Indians.
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 10 2 the Supreme Court was
faced with circumstances very similar to the circumstances inJicarilla v.
Supron. In White Mountain, the Indians contracted with non-Indians to
cut and transport timber within the Indian reservation. The Indians de-
rived substantial revenues from the timber harvest. Arizona attempted
to assess the non-Indian enterprise with a motor carrier license tax. '
0 3
The Indians argued that the taxes unlawfully infringed upon tribal self-
government. The Supreme Court found three reasons why federal law
preempted the state tax.
First, comprehensive federal regulations governed Indian timber
93. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-7-1 to 10 (1978) (repealed 1984).
94. 728 F.2d at 1561.
95. Id. at 1561-62.
96. Id. at 1569-72 (Seymour,J, dissenting) (citing White Mountain Apache v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980)).
97. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
98. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
99. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
100. See Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 1670-67; Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. at
481-83.
101. 728 F.2d at 1569 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
102. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
103. Id. at 138-41.
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harvesting. The Court found the regulatory scheme "so pervasive as to
preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed."' 10 4 The regula-
tion of oil and gas leasing on Indian lands, at issue inficarilla v. Supron,
was similarly comprehensive. 10 5 Second, the White Mountain Court dis-
cussed the general federal policy of encouraging tribes to achieve eco-
nomic self-sufficiency. The taxes diminished tribal revenues and
thereby thwarted this policy.' 0 6 In the same manner, the price ceiling of
the NMNGPA diminished the Jicarilla's royalty revenues.' 0 7 Third, the
Court found further support for preemption in finding that the Indians
received no benefit from the state tax.' 0 8 InJicarilla v. Supron, there was
no evidence that the Indians received any benefit from the NMNGPA.
The Tenth Circuit, on rehearing, should follow the principles in
White Mountain and find the the NMNGPA does not limit the value of
natural gas for the purpose of determining Indian royalties. This result
is not without practical implications. Production might become unprof-
itable by limiting the price at which gas can be sold under state price
control acts, while simultaneously allowing royalties to be calculated
without the restraints of state price control acts. This effect could con-
ceivably reduce oil and gas leasing operations on Indian lands and re-
duce total royalties to the Indians, thereby effectively thwarting the
congressional objective of promoting Indian self-sufficiency. 10 9 Never-
theless, given the absence of legislative directives to the contrary, the
Supreme Court's reasoning in White Mountain should compel a finding
that state gas price control acts are preempted by federal law to the ex-
tent they purport to limit Indian royalties.
C. Strict Statutory Compliance
In Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,' 10
the Tenth Circuit held that Mountain Bell did not acquire a right-of-way
from the Pueblo Indians in 1928 for telephone and telegraph lines. The
Tenth Circuit so ruled despite the following facts: (1) in 1928, the
Pueblo granted Mountain Bell a right-of-way; (2) the Secretary of the
Interior approved the grant; and (3) Mountain Bell was dismissed from a
pending quiet title action by a court relying on these very facts. I"'
For many years Congress has considered itself guardian of the In-
dian tribes of this country."t 2 As early as 1834, Congress expressed this
view in the Nonintercourse Act' 13 which prevented alienation of Indian
104. Id. at 149.
105. See 30 C.F.R. Part 221 (1982).
106. 448 U.S. at 148-50.
107. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' intent
to maximize the Indians' income from mineral deposits.
108. 448 U.S. at 150-51.
109. 728 F.2d at 1569 (Seymour J., dissenting).
110. 734 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 242 (1984).
111. Id. at 1403-04.
112. See generatty Solem v. Bartlett, 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
113. Nonintercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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lands without Congress' express approval. Parts of this Act were un-
clear, however, and it was held not to apply to the Pueblo by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Joseph.
1 14
In the New Mexico Enabling Act, 1 5 Congress, in 1910, retained
jurisdiction and control over the Pueblo's lands."16 In order to clarify
the status of Pueblo lands, Congress passed the Pueblo Lands Act in
1924.117 In 1927, the United States filed a quiet title action pursuant to
the Pueblo Lands Act' 18 to determine the status of the lands claimed by
the Pueblos, including the right-of-way involved in the present case." 19
Mountain Bell was named a defendant in that suit.
In an attempt to obtain an easement to construct, maintain, and op-
erate a telephone and telegraph line, Mountain Bell entered into a right-
of-way agreement with the Pueblos. Although the Secretary of the Inte-
rior approved this agreement, it was not approved by Congress as re-
quired by section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act. 120 Nevertheless, on the
basis of the right-of-way agreement, Mountain Bell was dismissed from
the 1928 quiet title action.
12 1
In 1980, the Pueblo filed an action seeking damages for the alleged
trespass of Mountain Bell's telephone and telegraph lines. Relying on
the 1928 right-of-way agreement, Mountain Bell sought partial summary
judgment on the issue of the alleged trespass occurring since 1928.122
The district court denied this motion and entered partial summary judg-
ment against Mountain Bell on the basis of the failure to comply with the
Pueblo Lands Act.'
23
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that section 17
of the Pueblo Lands Act clearly required the approval of both Congress
and the Secretary of the Interior to alienate Pueblo lands.' 24 The 1928
right-of-way agreement was not ratified by Congress and therefore did
114. 94 U.S. 614 (1876). The Supreme Court in 1876 found that the Pueblos were a
civilized, Christian, agrarian society, wholly unlike the nomadic "savages" sought to be
protected by the 1834 Act.
115. New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910, ch. 310 § 2, 36 Star. 557, 558-59.
116. This provision withstood a constitutional attack in United States v. Sandoval, 231
U.S. 28 (1913), which distinguished Joseph.
117. Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, ch. 331 § 2, 43 Stat. 636.
118. Id.
119. The quiet title action, filed in the Federal District Court for the District of New
Mexico, was entitled United States and Guardian of the Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Brown, No.
1814, Equity (D.N.M. 1928).
120. The Pueblo Lands Act provides:
No right, title, or interest in or to the lands of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico
to which their title has not been extinguished as hereinbefore determined shall
hereafter be acquired or initiated by virtue of the laws of the State of New Mexico,
or in any other manner except as may hereafter be provided by Congress, and no sale, grant,
lease of any character, or other conveyance of lands, or any title or claim thereto,
made by any Pueblo as a community, or any Pueblo Indian living in a community
of Pueblo Indians, in the State of New Mexico, shall be of any validity in law or in
equity unless the same be first approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, ch. 331 § 17, 43 Star. 636, 641-42 (emphasis added).
121. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 734 F.2d at 1404.
122. Id.
123. Id. See also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124. 734 F.2d at 1406.
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not result in a valid right-of-way. 125
Mountain Bell also asserted that because of its dismissal from the
1928 quiet title action, the present action was barred by the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Tenth Circuit dismissed this
argument because it found that the 1928 dismissal was not a final judg-
ment as required by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel. 12 6 The court gave several reasons for this finding. First, the 1928
order dismissing Mountain Bell did not specify whether the dismissal
was with or without prejudice. As a matter of law, the court found the
dismissal to be without prejudice. 12 7 Second, in dismissing Mountain
Bell, the court in 1928 did not pass on the merits of the agreement.
Quoting National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Parkinson,128 the court
stated that "[c]ourts do not validate that which is invalid by merely con-
senting to a dismissal of the controversy over which its jurisdiction has
been invoked."' 129 In Pueblo of Santa Ana, the Tenth Circuit found that
the failure of Mountain Bell to comply with section 17 of the Pueblo
Lands Act was not before the court in 1928 and, therefore, did not result
in a final judgment for purposes of applying res judicata.130
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Pueblo of Santa Ana comports with
the Supreme Court's decisions regarding alienation of Indian lands.131
Purported alienation of property interests, like the right-of-way in this
case, must strictly comply with the procedures set forth by statute.
D. Indian Sovereign Immunity Circumscribed by F.R. C.P. 19-Indispensable
Parties
In Lear Petroleum Corp. v. Wilson, 13 2 the Tenth Circuit considered
whether Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which re-
quires dismissal of any action in which all indispensable parties are not
joined, precluded consideration of an interpleader action when some
potential parties in interest are Indians. 13 3
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1407.
127. Id. See also Ex Parte Skinner and Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1923).
128. 136 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1943).
129. 734 F.2d at 1407 (quoting Parkinson, 136 F.2d at 509).
130. 734 F.2d at 1407.
131. See Solem v. Bartlett, 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
132. 730 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1984).
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 states:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whosejoinder will not deprive the court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest re-
lating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obliga-
tions by reason of his claimed interest.
(emphasis added).
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as de-
scribed in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall
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The Lear Corporation held oil and gas leases on lands bordering
the Arkansas River in LeFlore County, Oklahoma. Lessors of these
lands included the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Indian nations,
as well as Wilson and the non-Indian defendants named in the com-
plaint.' 3 4 Due to the movement of the bed of the Arkansas River
through erosion and accretion, Lear was uncertain as to who was enti-
tled to the royalties accrued from oil and gas production. To resolve the
uncertainty, Lear brought an interpleader action. 135 At trial, no evi-
dence was presented of any attempt to join the Indians, yet it was admit-
ted that the Indians had received royalties prior to the suit.' 36 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed the action
sua sponte, for non-joinder, finding that the Indian nations were indis-
pensable parties. 
13 7
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the lower
court erred in dismissing the action.1 38 The court reasoned that the dis-
trict court did not sufficiently consider whether the parties would be left
without any remedy, and it concluded that "[a] judgment can be entered
which will be adequate under rule 19(b)."'
3 9
Judge Doyle, dissenting, would have affirmed the district court.
Judge Doyle reasoned that since the Indians gave Lear a lease for the
land, the Indians obviously believe they have a right to it. 140 Further-
more, Judge Doyle found it "impossible" to understand how the lower
court could determine royalty rights without first determining owner-
ship.141 Although he perceived the need to weigh Lear's need for a rem-
edy against the Indian's sovereign immunity, Judge Doyle refused to tip
the scale in favor of Lear. He concluded that the implicit result of the
majority opinion is to give Lear full and complete title to the land. 14 2
While Rule 19(b) has often been applied to bar suits involving In-
dian sovereign immunity, 14 3 the holding in Lear reaffirms the exception
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be preju-
dicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provision in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the preju-
dice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the per-
son's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for non-joinder.
134. 730 F.2d at 1364.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
136. 730 F.2d at 1364.
137. Id. See also McShon v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1960), which ordered the
dismissal of a quiet title action where there was evidence that possible claimants were not
joined.
138. 730 F.2d at 1364-65.
139. Id. at 1365 (distinguishing Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir.
1974), in which the court approved a dismissal for non-joinder of an indispensable party,
finding, inter alia, that there were alternative remedies available to the plaintiff).
140. 730 F.2d at 1365.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Lomayaktwea v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975).
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to this rule, which was first applied by the Tenth Circuit in Manygoats v.
Kleppe. 14 4 In Manygoats, the Tenth Circuit stated that "[d]ismissal of the
action for nonjoinder of the Tribe would produce an anamolous result"
because the Indians had nothing to gain by consenting to the suit, and
that by asserting their immunity they could not be adversely affected.1
4 5
The Manygoats court found the controlling test under Rule 19(b) to be
"whether in equity and good conscience the case can proceed in the
absence of the Tribe."' 14 6 Thus, the equities of a particular case may
allow a court to proceed despite the failure to join an indispensable In-
dian party, so long as an appropriate remedy can be fashioned to protect
the Indians' interests. 1
47
The Lear decision allows several desirable results. First, federal
courts can quiet title as between all non-Indian parties before them. 1
48
Second, Lear prevents Indians from using their sovereign immunity as a
shield to avoid the merits of a controversy. 149 Third, due to thejurisdic-
tional nature of the holding in Lear, Indians are not compelled to forgo
their sovereign immunity and join a suit because they will not be barred
by the doctrine of res judicata from contesting the result at a later date.
If the Indians feel injured by such a decision, they can challenge it if and
when they see fit.
E. Indian Taxation of Natural Resources
In Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,15 0 the Navajo had
enacted a tax on oil and gas production. The affected oil and gas produ-
cers brought suit, claiming that the taxes were invalid because the Nav-
ajo failed to obtain the required approval of the Secretary of the
Interior. The Navajo tax, unlike the Apache tax involved in Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe,' 5 ' is not expressly subject to approval by the Secre-
tary because the Navajo have chosen not to reorganize under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934152 (IRA). Nevertheless, Judge Jenkins of
the United States District Court for the District of Utah agreed with the
144. 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977). The court used an equitable standard by balancing
the parties' interests.
145. Id. at 559.
146. Id. (citing Wright v. First Nat'l Bank of Altus Okla., 483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir.
1973)).
147. 730 F.2d at 1364.
148. See id.
149. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
150. 715 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Southland]. Other plaintiffs
included Phillips Petroleum Company, Shell Oil Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Superior
Oil Company, The Union Oil Company of California, Willshire Oil Company of Texas,
Anadarko Production Company and Texaco, Inc. The State of Utah, San Juan County,
and various state and local individuals and organizations intervened to protect their inter-
ests. Several tribal organizations and individuals were named as defendants. The United
States and several entities within the Department of the Interior were also named as
defendants.
151. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The Supreme Court in Aerrion suggested that secretarial
approval of Indian taxes would minimize the abuse of the power to tax. Id. at 141. South-
land held that this safeguard may not be available.
152. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982). See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134.
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producers and found that the Secretary's approval was a necessary con-
dition to the validity of the Navajo taxes.
153
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Seth, re-
versed the district court, refusing to impute a requirement of secretarial
approval where none is explicitly required by law.' 54 In so doing, the
Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Merrion15 5 that Indian sover-
eignty affords Indians substantial authority in the area of taxation of nat-
ural resources. Also consistent with Merrion, the Southland decision
indicates that the Tenth Circuit will defer to Congress when it comes to
limiting Indian taxing authority.
15 6
The district court's holding would have forced the Secretary to de-
termine appropriate levels of Indian taxation without any statutory gui-
dance. Apart from the legal problems, the practical problems posed by
such a requirement would also justify its invalidation. 157 The Tenth Cir-
cuit therefore correctly found Merrion's implied requirement of secre-
tarial approval repugnant to the federal policy of encouraging tribal
independence. 158 Merrion indicates the Supreme Court's unwillingness
to repress the Indians' ability to tax. This unwillingness is exemplified
by the Tenth Circuit's holding in Southland. In situations such as the one
addressed in Southland, guidelines, safeguards, or limitations on the In-
dians' power to tax must come from Congress, not from the courts.
II. OIL AND GAS LAW
A. The Enforcement Power of FERC under the Natural Gas Act
The Natural Gas Act1 59 (NGA) delegates authority to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to fix rates and schedules, and
to order refunds when it finds that unjust or unreasonable rates have
been charged.160 Courts have consistently held that this power to order
refunds is purely remedial and does not authorize FERC to impose pen-
alties. 16 1 In Southern Union Gas Co. v. FERC,162 the Tenth Circuit re-
versed an order by the FERC which sought to impose a penalty on
153. 715 F.2d at 488-89.
154. Id. at 489.
155. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), afd, 455 U.S.
130 (1982).
156. See Southland, 715 F.2d at 489.
157. It is unclear what sanctions the Secretary could impose, what tribes and lands
would be subject to the Secretary's powers, or what standards the Secretary must use to
determine appropriate levels of taxation. While these arguments might be applied to Mer-
rion and other situations where Indian constitutions mandate secretarial review and ap-
proval, the point is that, in the absence of legislative guidelines, rate setting by the
Secretary would be neither appropriate nor effective.
158. Id. at 490 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-
44 (1980)), to wit: "Ambiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to
comport with. . . traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encour-
aging tribal independence."
159. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1982). FERC's predecessor was the Federal Power Commission.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1982).
161. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Nat'l Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 618 (1944).
162. 725 F.2d 99 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Southern Union Gas Company (SUG). In the process, the court pro-
vided some guidelines for determining whether FERC action is a proper
administrative remedy or whether it serves as a penalty.
In 1973, SUG was unable to provide sufficient quantities of natural
gas to its customers in Beaver, Oklahoma. To compensate for this
shortage, SUG diverted gas it had available under irrigation contracts to
meet the primarily residential needs of Beaver.' 6 3 These diversions
technically violated the NGA because SUG failed to file notices of the
changes with the FERC as required by statute.' 64 However, due to the
small amounts of gas actually diverted, no shortages were created, nor
were any damages suffered by the gas suppliers' other customers.
16 5
FERC referred the NGA violations to the Department of Justice which
decided not to institute criminal proceedings. 166 FERC then attempted
to impose quasi-punitive sanctions by ordering SUG to pay its suppliers
for the diverted gas under "emergency rate" schedules rather than at
the lower rates under the original irrigation contracts. 16 7 FERC as-
serted that its order was a proper administrative action, authorized by
section 16 of the NGA. 168 The court disagreed, finding that the Com-
mission's order was actually a penalty and thus beyond its authority.169
The court in SUG v. FERC indicated two useful factors for deter-
mining when an assessment is within the scope of the Commission's
powers. The first factor is the purpose and justification for making the
assessment. The second and less definitive factor is the evidence ad-
duced to correlate the Commission's reparative order to actual injury
suffered by gas customers. The first factor relied on in SUG v. FERC was
also considered in Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC.170 In Mesa, the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the purposes and goals of the NGA and offered several guide-
lines concerning reparative orders under the NGA. In Mesa, a gas pro-
ducer violated the NGA by terminating its gas sales to a pipeline
company without the approval of the Federal Power Commission (FPC).
The FPC assessed the producer for the difference between the pre-ter-
mination contract price and the average replacement cost. The Fifth
Circuit held that this assessment was not a penalty, but that it was within
the broad regulatory powers of the FPC. 17 l Citing Niagra Mohawk Power
Corp. v. FPC, ' 72 the court in Mesa held that the Commission's powers are
163. Id. at 100.
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1982).
165. 725 F.2d at 101.
166. Id. The court noted that referral to the Dept. ofJustice of the FERC complaint was
the only remedy contemplated under the Act. Id.
167. Id. at 101-02.
168. Section 16 provides in pertinent part:
The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe,
issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
52 Stat. 830 (1938); 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1982).
169. 725 F.2d at 102-03.
170. 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
171. Id. at 186-89.
172. 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (quoted at 441 F.2d at 187-88).
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broadest in its role of effectuating the congressional objectives of the
NGA and narrower when ascertaining statutory violations.1 73 In other
words, federal courts afford the Commission much greater deference
upon review of remedial action than upon review of action involving de-
terrent sanctions. Because these two functions often merge or overlap,
careful characterization is crucial. In disallowing the assessment in SUG
v. FERC, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Commission's brief character-
ized the assessment as a penalty.'
7 4
The second factor stressed by the Tenth Circuit in SUG v. FERC was
the complete absence of evidence indicating that any injury was caused
by SUG's violation of the NGA. The lack of evidence led the court to
conclude that the order could only have been punitive. 175 Although the
Commission was not required to prove that violations of the NGA re-
sulted in actual injury before it could take remedial action, 17 6 SUG used
the absence of injury to help prove the punitive nature of the Commis-
sion's assessment.
177
In sum, although section 16 of the NGA vests broad powers in
FERC, these powers do not include the imposition of civil penalties.1
7 8
While the distinction between remedies and penalties remains some-
what ambiguous, the Tenth Circuit's decision in SUG v. FERC indicates
that the purpose and justification for the assessment as well as the actual
injury sought to be remedied are both important factors.
B. Unit Operating Agreements-How Deep Do They Go?
In Morgan v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,179 the Tenth Circuit held that a unit
operating agreement' 8° is not limited to certain geological formations
unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise. Under the Tenth
Circuit's ruling, production from any geological horizon will hold unit-
173. 379 F.2d at 159 (quoted at 441 F.2d at 187-88).
174. 725 F.2d at 102-03.
175. SUG offered testimony that the illegal diversions averaged only one-tenth of one
percent of each supplier's daily volumes. There was no evidence of any resultant shortage
or damage of any type. 725 F.2d at 101.
176. In Mesa Petroleum, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971), the court upheld a remedial as-
sessment and noted that it would not require the Commission to prove an actual injury.
There was "ample support" in the record that gas customers had to pay a higher price as a
result of Mesa's violation. The court therefore deferred to the agency's conclusion that
the remedial assessment was appropriate-
177. 725 F.2d at 101.
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1982).
179. 726 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1984).
180. A unit operating agreement, also known as a unit agreement is "an agreement or
plan of development and operation for the recovery of oil and gas made subject thereto as
a single consolidated unit without regard to separate ownerships and for the allocation of
costs and benefits on a basis as defined in the agreement or plan." 8 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw 798-99 (1982). Unit operating agreements are written for two
interrelated reasons. First, many states have oil and gas commissions (such as the Kansas
Corporation Commission) which require unitization before the state will grant a well drill-
ing permit. Second, unitization eliminates the necessity of drilling unnecessary and un-
economical wells, which would rcsult in physical and economic waste. See 6 H. WILLIAMS
AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS Iw § 901 (1983).
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ized leases past their primary terms.1 8 '
In Morgan, the court decided two cases which were consolidated for
purposes of appeal.' 8 2 Both cases resulted from unit operating agree-
ments which were written in response to orders of the Kansas Corpora-
tion Commission (KCC) around 1940 regarding unitization of specific
geological formations.' 8 3 Although the operating agreements were
written in response to the Commission's orders, they lacked any specific
language limiting their scope to that of the Commission's orders.'
8 4
In Anadarko Production Co. v. Taylor,18 5 one of the two cases consoli-
dated for appeal, the district court found that the parties intended' 8 6 to
unitize the leases only to the horizons where the KCC required unitiza-
tion.18 7 Production from other horizons therefore did not hold the
leases to all depths but only to the depths where production had been
obtained.' 8 8 In Morgan v. Mobil Oil Corp.,189 the same district court
found that the intent behind the unit operating agreements was to hold
the leases as to all horizons. 190 In reconciling these two opinions, the
Tenth Circuit found the leases and subsequent agreements unambigu-
ous and imited its investigation to the four corners of the documents.
The court found no indication in either case of an intent to limit the
lessees' rights to any horizon, and held that the unitized areas were held
under lease to all depths by production from any geological horizon
within the units. 19 1
The underlying problem in Morgan was the age-old difficulty of tai-
loring a legal document to fit the needs, desires and intent of the parties.
The primary purpose of a unitization agreement is to facilitate produc-
181. Oil and gas leases usually contain two terms, a primary term, consisting of a fixed
time period in which the lessee must try to find oil and gas, and a secondary term of an
indefinite period. To propel the lease from the primary term into the secondary term
requires production of oil and gas or certain legal substitutes. See HEMINGWAY, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAS §§ 6.1-6.9 (2d ed. 1983).
182. Morgan v. Mobil Oil Corp. 556 F. Supp. 108 (D. Kan. 1983); Anadarko Prod. Co.
v. Taylor, 535 F. Supp. 103 (D. Kan 1982).
183. See Anadarko Prod. Co. v. Taylor, 535 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D. Kan. 1982) (order of
the KCC dated March 21, 1944). The KCC sought to regulate only certain shallow geolog-
ical formations. The unit operating agreements were written to comply with the regula-
tions and made reference to the specific formations regulated by the KCC. The
lessor/plaintiffs contended that the intent behind the unit operating agreements was to
unitize only the specified formations, and that the deep horizons were not held under lease
by production from the unitized shallow formations. See 726 F.2d at 1476.
184. 726 F.2d at 1476-77.
185. 535 F. Supp. 103 (D. Kan. 1982), rev'd, 726 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1984).
186. Both Morgan and Anadarko quoted Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732, 594 P.2d 177
(1979), for that case's statement of the law of Kansas regarding oil and gas lease
interpretation.
187. 535 F. Supp. at 109-11.
188. Production from "pooled" or "unitized" acreage inures to the benefit of all inter-
est holders in the acreage. Production in one part of the unitized acreage, therefore, le-
gally constitutes production for all interest holders regardless of the lease from which
production results. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 181 at § 7.13.
189. 556 F. Supp. 108 (D. Kan. 1983), afd, 726 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1984).
190. Id. at 114.
191. 726 F.2d at 1478, 1480.
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tion from an underground oil or gas reservoir. 19 2 Implicit in this pur-
pose is the idea that only one particular underground reservoir is to be
unitized. Otherwise, where several reservoirs overlap vertically but at
different horizons, unitization might become unfeasible as to all overlap-
ping reservoirs. Ideally, a unit agreement should be limited to a particu-
lar reservoir. 1
93
Unitization agreements, however, are often not limited to a particu-
lar reservoir or geological horizon. 19 4 Where the agreement is not so
limited, as in Morgan, the court's proper duty is not to rewrite the par-
ties' agreement but to enforce what the parties have expressed in their
agreement. Because favorable economics have increased interest in
deep geological horizons, practitioners need to consider oil and gas
rights vertically as well as horizontally when drafting documents con-
cerning oil and gas rights to ensure that such documents truly reflect the
intent of the parties.
III. REAL PROPERTY LAW
In Kemmerer Coal Co. v. Brigham Young University,195 the Tenth Circuit
considered whether a person has standing to assert alleged due process
violations suffered by a predecessor in interest to real property. The
court held that a successor does not have standing because such due
process rights are personal and can only be asserted by the person alleg-
edly suffering the deprivation.
1 9 6
Kemmerer brought this quiet title action after being deprived of
subsurface coal rights by a procedurally defective tax sale in 1936. Kem-
merer's predecessor in interest and record-owner of the coal rights re-
ceived no notice of the tax assessment or sale. 19 7 Instead, notice was
mistakenly sent to the surface owner. In 1975, a tax sale purchaser who
had been issued a tax deed in 1954 to the disputed underground rights
gifted one half of the rights to BYU. 19 8
The District Court for the District of Utah found that no notice of
the tax proceedings was given to anyone in Kemmerer's chain of title to
the coal rights. 19 9 The court held that this failure violated the title-
holder's due process rights and that therefore Utah's statute of limita-
tions had not run.200
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Saranac Land & Timber Co. v.
192. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 181 at 395.
193. See generally Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Co., 291 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1961).
194. But see the Model Form of Unit Agreement, as propounded by the American Petro-
leum Institute, which provides: "Describe by geologic name, depth interval or otherwise."
WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 920.1 at 1.2 (1981).
195. 723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983).
196. Id. at 57.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 54-55.
199. Id. at 55.
200. Id. Kemmerer asserted the due process challenge to get around the short statute
of limitations imposed by Utah to limit tax title challenges.
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Roberts,20 1 the Tenth Circuit noted that "a reasonable statute of limita-
tions can constitutionally bar claims based on alleged violations of fed-
eral due process rights."2 0 2 But the Tenth Circuit declined to base its
holding on Saranac, and instead decided the case on the basis of stand-
ing. The alleged due process violations were not suffered by Kemmerer
but by its predecessors in interest. The court found that due process
rights are personal, and held that Kemmerer lacked standing to assert
the deficiencies of the tax sale.
20 3
Although there is substantial case law which notes the personal na-
ture of constitutional rights in general, 20 4 Kemmerer has considerably ex-
tended this doctrine as it applies to a chain of title for real property.
The Kemmerer court cited numerous cases supporting the proposition
that constitutional rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicari-
ously. United States v. Haddon20 5 involved a chain of title to real property.
There, the First Circuit considered a condemnation proceeding in which
the record owner was allegedly denied due process for lack of notice.
One significant difference between Haddon and Kemmerer is that the First
Circuit expressly limited its holding in Haddon to those situations where
the party asserting due process violations was not in privity with the
party who actually suffered the violations. 20 6 In Haddon, the plaintiffs
claimed an interest in the land by way of a tax sale, which occurred sub-
sequent to the earlier condemnation proceeding. 20 7 Because they ac-
quired their interest through the tax sale, the plaintiffs were not in
privity with the persons who owned the land at the time of the condem-
nation proceeding. The court refused the plaintiffs' due process argu-
ment because the plaintiffs were not the owners at the time of the
condemnation. Noting the lack of privity between the plaintiff and the
owners who allegedly suffered the due process violation, the Haddon
court qualified its holding by stating "it is questionable to what degree
private claims based on defects in notice would pass to a successor in
interest." °2 0 8 Kemmerer has answered this question within the Tenth Cir-
cuit. By the court's holding, no successor in interest, bona fide pur-
chaser, or any other person in chain of title has standing to assert due
process violations suffered by a predecessor in a chain of title.
Andrew K. Sorensen
201. 177 U.S. 318 (1900).
202. 723 F.2d at 57.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
205. 550 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1977). The Kemmerer court also cited Hewitt v. Glaser Land
& Livestock Co., 626 P.2d 268 (Utah 1981).
206. 550 F.2d at 681.
207. Id. at 678.
208. Id. at 681.
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